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NOTE
Isle of Hispaniola: American Divorce Haven?
R ECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN the Nationality and Nationalization
laws of Mexico have abruptly curtailed the activities of "Mexi-
can divorce mills," located south of the American border. As
amended, Article 35 of the Mexican Code requires six months
residence before a non-citizen can petition for a divorce.1 The end
of this arrangement, long a boon to Mexican tourism2 and an acces-
sible "haven" for discontented American couples, was merely a tem-
porary impediment to those seeking foreign divorces. The two
nations occupying the small island of Hispaniola, Haiti and the Do-
minican Republic, quickly filled this vacuum with statutory modifi-
cations to their existing laws on divorce. By means of comparison
with the now defunct Mexican divorce laws and procedures, some
light can be thrown on the validity of these Haitian and Dominican
divorces for parties domiciled in the United States.
The particular concern of American divorce law has been the
exclusive control over the marital relations of parties domiciled
within the jurisdiction. The traditional basis for a court to gain
this control has been the domicile of at least one of the parties with-
in the territorial jurisdiction of the court.' Justice Frankfurter speak-
ing for the majority in Williams IP stated that "(u) nder our sys-
tem of law, judicial power to grant a divorce - jurisdiction, strictly
speaking -, is founded on domicile.'
The concept of domicile, the place of an individual's significant
social, political, and economic activity,6 introduces a legitimate state
interest because of the status concept of the marital relation. Three
parties play a role in the creation of the relationship: the husband,
the wife, and the state. Since the institution of marriage is tradi-
1 Amended Article 35 provides in pertinent part: "No judicial or administrative
agency shall entertain a divorce . . . of a foreigner if not accompanied by the certificate
that is issued by the Secretary of Gobernacion as to his legal residence in the country
and that his immigration status permits it to be acquired."
2 Divorce was reportedly a $50 million-a-year business in Mexico that drew some
18,000 Americans annually. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1972, § 10, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.).
3 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
4 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
5 Id. at 229; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 70, 71
(1971).
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 11, 12 (1971).
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tionally of great legal importance, the dissolution through divorce
or separation also concerns the state. As noted in Williams II,
"divorce, like marriage, is of concern not merely to the immediate
parties. . . It also touches the basic interests of the society." '7  As
a result, the state courts have jealously guarded the right to deter-
mine the standards for divorce, and have generally refused to rec-
ognize foreign decrees purportedly terminating the marital rela-
tions between domiciliaries in that court's jurisdiction.' Only New
York has taken the view that domicile is not the only standard
relevant to obtain jurisdiction for the divorce.'
Where a state court acquires proper jurisdiction, its decree or
judgment is entitled to recognition by all sister states due to the
constitutional mandate of Full Faith and Credit. This provision
carries no force outside the national boundaries, but the principle
of comity among nations may accomplish the same result.10 Com-
ity indicates that "one court should ordinarily respect the judgment
of another court in the absence of an obligation to do so. It is
not so much a legal rule as a recognition of the need to cooperate
among jurisdictions.''11 The principle has generally been adopted
by American courts,12 although not without limitation, as no court
will enforce a judgment contrary to the strong public policy of the
forum.'3
COMPARISON OF THE RELEVANT FOREIGN LAW
Prior to the 1971 amendments, Mexican divorce law contained
procedures for ex parte,"4 mail order,'" and bilateral" divorce ac-
7 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945).
8 Cocco v. Cocco, 23 Conn. Supp. 275, 181 A.2d 266 (Super. Ct. 1962); Common-
wealth v. Doughty, 187 Pa. Super. 499, 144 A.2d 521 (1958); Rydef v. Ryder, 2 Cal.
App. 2d 426, 37 P.2d 1069 (Dist. Ct. App. 1934). See also Annot., 13 A.L.R. 3d
1419, 1425 (1967).
9 Howe, The Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees in New York State, 40 COLUM.
L. REV. 373 (1940); Stimson, Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases: The Unsoundness of the
Domiciliary Theory, 42 A.B.A.J. 222 (1956). Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 21 App. Div.
2d 635,253 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1st Dep't 1964).
1 0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971).
11 H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 478 (Ist
ed. 1968).
1 2 See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971).
14 Ex parte divorce procedure is typified by physical presence of the plaintiff before
the foreign jurisdiction in which plaintiff is not a domicil and by service on the defendant
by either constructive or personal means, but defendant is not present at the hearing.
15 Mail order procedure, as implied by its name, is perfected by the use of the mail;
parties send a power of attorney to respective foreign counsel, the parties make no court
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tions. No American court has recognized the validity of either
ex parte or mail order decrees,' 7 but the bilateral form, where both
parties consent to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, has found
limited acceptance. The Mexican example can be used to predict
the success of bilateral actions in other countries. The practice in
the state of Chihuahua, Republic of Mexico, was to provide two al-
ternative bases for granting jurisdiction to a Mexican court over for-
eign citizens.'8 Article 22 provided that a "judge is competent
to entertain a contested divorce, in accord with the place of resi-
dence of the plaintiff."' 9  Proof of residence as outlined by Article
24 was satisfied by a certificate from a Municipal Register.2" In
effect, the residence is established by the party signing the Munici-
pal Register in the city in which he is bringing the action. Article
23 provided the alternative basis consisting of the "express and
tacit submission of these parties to the court's jurisdiction. ' 21
The Haitian courts also reject the traditional concept of domi-
cile as the jurisdictional basis and make a court competent to dis-
pose of a divorce case if the parties voluntarily submit to the court's
jurisdiction.22 The current law, which became effective June 28,
1971, eliminated the necessity of the plaintiff making a formal "elec-
tion de domicile" in Haiti during the pendency of the action2" and
added several grounds for seeking divorce.
The Dominican Republic entered into active competition for the
appearance and the finalized divorce decrees are returned via mail by the foreign attor-
neys of the parties.
16 A bilateral divorce results when the plaintiff personally appear's at the hearing
and the defendant either appears in person or by a duly authorized attorney.
IT Ex parte divorce, see Bethune v. Bethune, 192 Ark. 811, 94 S.W.2d 1043 (1936);
Kittel v. Kittel, 194 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Shenker v. Shenker, 18
Misc. 2d 606, 187 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup. Ct. 1959). See also Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 1714
(1967).
Mail order divorces, see State v. DeMeo, 20 N.J. 1, 118 A.2d 1 (1955); Annot.,
13 A.L.R.3d 1419 (1967).
18 For the full test of Articles Twenty-two, Twenty-three, and Twenty-four see
Wood v. Wood, 41 Misc. 2d 95, 98, 245 N.Y.S.2d 800, 805 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
19 ld.
20 Id.
21Id.
22 "When a foreign plaintiff personally submits voluntarily to the Haitian jurisdic-
tion and when a defendant shall have appointed a duly mandated representative, this
voluntary submission of both parties to the Haitian justice will give competence of the
matter to the Haitian court." Law of June 28, 1971, Art. II.
23 ,... tout'ists, visiting persons and residing aliens may apply to Haitian courts for
a domicil in Haiti during the pendency of the divorce action." Law of June 28, 1971,
Art. X.
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divorce market with passage of Law 142 on May 18, 1971.24 The
statutes' jurisdictional standard, like its Haitian counterpart, is based
on the voluntary submission of the parties to the court's jurisdic-
tion.25 Such in personam jurisdiction requires the plaintiff to appear
in person and the defendant to at least be represented by counsel.
The Mexican federal law contains 17 grounds for divorce listed
in the Civil Code.26 Each state within the republic has also codi-
fied its own laws on divorce, most of which are similar to the fed-
eral provisions. One notable exception was the state of Chihua-
hua, which made liberal modifications to the national standards.
For example, the federal time period after which an abandoned
party may initiate action for divorce is six months.28 The Chihuahua
standard requires the deserted party to wait only three months.
The state has also adopted the ground of incompatibility of char-
acter as a basis for divorce while such a standard is non-existent
under the federal law. 29  This particular ground has been successful-
ly claimed in a substantial number of cases, and it is contended that
its proof may be satisfied by its "mere assertion" before a sympa-
thetic court.80
24 "Foreigners who are in this country, although not residents, can be divorced by
mutual consent, providing, however, that at least one of the parties must be physically
present, and the other represented by a special attorney in fact." Law No. 142, Art.
I, Paragraph V.
25Id.
26 Grounds for divorce under Mexican Federal Law: (1) Adultery; (2) fact that wife
gave birth to child conceived before marriage and judicially declaeed illegitimate; (3)
proposal of husband to prostitute wife or his receiving remuneration to permit such
prostitution; (4) efforts of either spouse to make other commit a crime; (5) attempts to
corrupt children and toleration of such corruption; (6) syphilis, tuberculosis or any
other incurable chronic disease which is contagious and hereditary, and impotence aris-
ing after marriage; (7) incurable mental alienation; (8) unjustified abandonment of
home for six months; (9) abandonment of home for reason authorizing a divorce, if
prolonged foe' over a year without institution of a divorce action by absent spouse;
(10) declaration of absence by reason of disappearance for over two years, and declara-
tion of presumption of death; (11) cruel treatment, threats and grave insults; (12) re-
fusal to support, where right to support exists and cannot be enforced; (13) slanderous
charge by one spouse against the other of a crime carrying over two years imprison-
ment; (14) commission of a nonpolitical, infamous crime carrying over two years im-
prisonment; (15) habits of gambling, dxfunkenness or use of drugs, when they threaten
family ruin or cause constant marital discord; (16) acts of either spouse against person
or property of other which in other circumstances would be punished by at least one
year imprisonment; (17) mutual consent. 5 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECroRY
3413 (104th ed. 1972).
27 Summers, The Divorce Laws of Mexico, 2 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
310 (1935).
28Id. at 319.
29 Id.
30 Du Puy, Divorce by Mail-Ease and Cheapness of Mexican Decrees Attract Thous-
ands, 1 Today, June 9, 1934, at 8.
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The "mutual consent" ground for divorce presents an even
more liberal standard under both the federal and Chihuahua laws.
The procedure basically allows for termination of the marital rela-
tion upon agreement of the parties. 1  It provides that, "when both
parties mutually consent to the termination of the marriage, are of
age, have no children and are of accord as to the liquidation of com-
munity property, they may present themselves before the clerk of
the civil register of their domicile and manifest their intention of
procuring a divorce.''32 After a court imposed cooling-off period of
15 days, the parties are in a position to obtain a final decree of di-
vorce. Even where the parties fail to meet all of the criteria, such
as the condition of having no children or the inability to agree on
the disposition of property, a court has discretion to grant a divorce
after an unsuccessful attempt by the parties to effect a reconcilia-
tion.
By comparison, the Haitian divorce code appears to be more re-
strictive in that only ten grounds for divorce are recognized.3 3
However, included in this group are the grounds of incompatibility
of character and mutual consent. While incompatibility is basical-
ly a procedural step both in Mexico and Haiti, the ground of mu-
tual consent in Haiti is closely monitored by the court. 4 For this
reason it does not lend itself to actively participate in the "quickie"
international divorce trade. Mutual consent for both native and
foreign parties, is only available if the male is at least twenty-five
years old and the female is between the ages of twenty-one and
forty-five. The parties must have been married at least two years
but not over twenty. To these age and duration requirements the
court has initiated a protracted waiting period of at least fifteen
months with court sponsored attempts at reconcilation during that
period. This procedure makes divorce by mutual consent in Haiti
a rather rigorous exercise and impracticable for Americans seeking
a Mexican-style divorce.
31 5 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra, note 26.
32 Id.
33 Haitian grounds for divorce include: (1) adultery of wife; (2) adultery of husband
if he had the concubine in the marital home; (3) excesses; (4) cruelty; (5) grave and
public insults; (6) sentence after trial to an effective and infamous punishment; (7)
sentence by default to a penalty carrying suspension of civil rights if the judgment is
not vacated within five years; and (8) mutual consent. 5 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW
DIRECTORY 3266 (104th ed. 1972); see also Fofscher, Haitian, Dominican Law on
Divorce Evaluated, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 1971, at 1.
34 For an outline of the procedure of divorce based on grounds of mutual consent,
see 5 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 33.
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Foreign divorces in the Dominican Republic are governed by
Law No. 142, adopted May 18, 1971. Mutual consent is the ex-
clusive ground provided with respect to foreign parties.3 5 The pro-
cedure for native couples requires a thirty to sixty day cooling-off
period.36 However, the country's New York consulate has distrib-
uted a memorandum indicating that the waiting period for foreign-
ers will be a minimum of only seventy-two hours.3 7
MAJORITY RULE IN THE UNITED STATES
The majority of courts in the United States view domicile as the
principal means of obtaining proper jurisdiction over the marital
status. Domicile of the parties determines the res of the marriage,
thus granting the court in rem jurisdiction. 38  A number of states
that are representative of this majority view have questioned the
ability of comity to supersede their own jurisdictional requirements.
These jurisdictions found the use of the comity principle particu-
larly offensive when used to terminate the marital status of persons
domiciled in the state during the action. For example, in Golden
v. Golden39 the parties obtained a divorce as a result of a single
day's journey from New Mexico into the Republic of Mexico.
Some months later the wife brought an action in New Mexico, the
domicile state, to compel alimony payments. By way of defense,
Mr. Golden claimed his ex-wife's participation in the Mexican di-
vorce estopped her from bringing the present action. In denying
recognition of the Mexican decree, the court affirmatively cited the
California case of Ryder v. Ryder,40 stating that, "(t)he general
rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of divorce rests up-
on the domicile . . .and a decree of divorce rendered in a foreign
jurisdiction may be impeached and denied recognition upon the
ground that neither of the parties had such domicile or residence at
the divorce forum notwithstanding the recital in the decree."'" The
New Mexico court held that recognition of such divorce would be
"contrary to the public policy of this state.''42
35 See note 24 supra.
36 See note 34 supra.
37 Memorandum from the Office of the General Consulate of the Dominican Repub-
lic in New York City, Feb. 25, 1972.
38 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
39 41 N.M. 356,68 P.2d 928 (1937).
40 2 Cal. App. 2d 426, 37 P.2d 1069 (1934).
41 Golden v. Golden, 41 N.M. 356, 365, 68 P.2d 928, 933 (1937).
42 Id. at 368, 68 P.2d at 935.
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Ohio has also taken a position with the majority view on this
issue by challenging the application of comity to supply a foreign
court with jurisdiction over the parties. In Bobala v. Bobala43 the
husband initially filed for divorce in Ohio but later proceeded to
Mexico for the purpose of acquiring the same divorce decree. Dis-
regarding an injunction against the Mexican action, Mr. Bobala
completed the necessary formalities. Upon notification of the pend-
ing action, the wife made an appearance through an attorney to
contest the divorce. Having lost at both the trial and appellate
levels of the Mexican system, Mrs. Bobala initiated a divorce action
in Ohio. The Ohio court dismissed the husband's defense of res
judicata and held that the Mexican court lacked jurisdiction over
the parties. The court stated that, "jurisdiction cannot be obtained
by consent of the parties, waiver, or estoppel. Jurisdiction is pre-
scribed by law and cannot be increased or diminished by consent
of the parties, and where there is want of jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter a judgment is void .... ... The Ohio Court noted that
the principle of comity is an obligation of "deference and respect,"
and is not admissible or controlling when its application would be
"contrary to its (the state's) known policy or prejudicial to its in-
terest. 
4 5
In Warrender v. Warrender46 the parties, both New Jersey domi-
ciliaries, agreed to procure a Mexican divorce. The wife, armed
with her husband's power of attorney, went to Juarez and within
one day transacted the necessary procedural formalities and re-
turned to New Jersey. The divorce decree based its jurisdiction
upon the voluntary submission of the parties to the court's jurisdic-
tion. No reference was made to the actual domicile of either of
the parties. Subsequently, the wife brought suit in New Jersey for
custody of the children and separate maintenance. In granting
the wife's pleas, the Warrender court held:
There is no question but that the Mexican divorce is absolutely
void on its face and that it has not legally terminated the marriage
of the parties. Both parties were and are domiciliaries of New
Jersey, and there is not the faintest pretense of adjudication by the
decree of either residence or domicile of either of them in Mexico
when rendered. 47
43 68 Ohio App. 63, 33 N.E.2d 889 (1943).
44 Id. at 71, 33 N.E.2d at 849.
45Id.
46 79 N.J. 114, 190 A.2d 684 (App. Div. 1963); afi'd, 42 N.J. 287, 200 A.2d 684
(1964).
47 Id. at 118, 190 A.2d at 686.
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This entire line of cases shares the same fatal omission in that the
parties failed to acquire proper jurisdiction through domicile. The
competency of the court is dependent on this factor of domicile,
without which the validity of the divorce decree is in question. 8
The attempted adjudication of the rights of non-domiciliaries vio-
lated the strong public policy of exclusive state control over the di-
vorce law. While these cases deal exclusively with attempted Mexi-
can divorces, the same general considerations apply to both Haitian
and Dominican divorces. In Mexico, the jurisdiction of the courts
was not based on domicile, but rather the express submission of the
parties to the court. Similarly, the defective jurisdictional basis of
the Haitian and Dominican courts will render these decisions inef-
fective in the the majority of American states.
THE UNIFORM DIVORCE RECOGNITION ACT
The U.D.R.A.,4" a legislative response to extranational divorces,
was presented in 1948 by the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws for adoption by interested states. As
stated within the Commissioner's Prefatory Notes,
this act takes its conception from the public dissatisfaction which
has arisen over the practice of 'migratory divorces,' whereby resi-
dents of one state journey to another to take advantage of laxer
or more speedy divorce procedures than those afforded by the state
of their domicile.50
With this motivation,
the aim of this proposal is to preserve to each state the authority
to determine the marital status of its own domiciliaries to the full-
est extent possible under existing constitutional doctrines.51
To fulfill this objective, the uniform statute invalidates a divorce
obtained outside the jurisdiction where both parties to the marriage
"were domiciled in this state at the time the proceeding for the di-
vorce was commenced." 2  Section 2 provides that a party holds
prima facie domicile within a jurisdiction if either of two conditions
are met: (1) the person obtaining the divorce was "domiciled in
this state within 12 months prior to the commencement of the pro-
48 Torlonia v. Torlonia, 108 Conn. 292, 142 A. 843 (1928).
49 Presently, ten states have this act in their' statutes with only slight modification:
California, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Is-
land, South Carolina, Washington and Wisconsin. 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 457.
5 0 UNIFORM DIVORCE RECOGNITION ACT, Commissioner's Prefatory Note.
51 Id.
521d. § 1.
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ceeding . . . and resumed residence in this state within 18 months
after the date of his departure,"" or (2) a party maintains a place
of residence within the state during the period he remains outside
the jurisdiction.54
The uniform law supports the majority United States position
of the res or status theory of the marital relation based on domi-
cile. Indeed, the comments to the act,55 various cases," and com-
mentators,5" urge-that the statute is merely a codification of the com-
mon law view in most states. As the jurisdictional basis for divorce
in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic is the voluntary submis-
sion to the court's authority, such decrees would be incompetent un-
der the uniform statute.
MINORITY RULE: NEW YORK
The state of New York represents a minority of one in the rec-
ognition of Mexican bilateral divorces. However, it joins the ma-
jority view of refusing to recognize either mail order 8 or ex parte
foreign decrees.59 The New York viewpoint is attributable to two
major considerations. The first is the restrictive nature of the pres-
ent divorce code, which only allows an action to lie on grounds of
adultery, cruelty, abandonment, or two years separation pursuant to
a separation agreement.6" This suggests that a liberal recognition
of foreign divorces serves as a safety valve in that it offers an alter-
native to the rigorous state procedures. 6' The second has been at-
tributed to the unwillingness of the New York courts to adopt the
res or status concept of the marital relationship. 2
The controlling principle in the recognition of foreign divorces
has not been the Full Faith and Credit clause, but rather, the princi-
ple of comity. Comity requires a general recognition of the acts and
decrees of another jurisdiction unless it appears to be contrary or re-
58Id. § 2.
54Id.
55 Id. Commissioner's Note (c).
56 Sohnlein v. Winchell, 230 Cal. App. 2d 508, 41 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1964).
57 See, e.g., Stumberg, The Migratory Divorce, 33 WASH. L. REV. 331 (1958).
58 Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146,81 N.E.2d 880 (1960).
59 Alfaro v. Alfaro, 5 App. Div. 2d 770, 169 N.Y.S. 943 (1958), aft'd, 7 N.Y. 949,
165 N.E.2d 880 (1960).
6 0 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1972-73).
61 Howe, note 9 supra.
62 See note 9 supra.
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pugnant to the policy or law of the state."3 Courts in New York
have routinely utilized thisprinciple as a basis for the recognition
of foreign decrees.
4
Public policy is to be gleaned from "the law of the State, whether
found in the constitution, the statutes, or judicial records." 5  The
state constitution reveals no compelling prohibition of the recogni-
tion of a foreign decree, as long as it is obtained within the require-
ments of the foreign jurisdiction.
The Rosenstiel case, 66 affirmed by the highest state court, re-
viewed the applicable case law with respect to the bilateral Mexican
divorce. The Superior Court was clearly faced with the recogni-
tion issue in this case, and in upholding the Mexican divorce, deter-
mined that domicile is not mandatory for a court to have the proper
jurisdictional base. Citing Drew v. Hobby,6 the court stated that,
"it was long ago decided in New York that lack of domicile is not
necessarily a bar to the recognition of a foreign divorce." '68 The
companion case to Rosenstie6 0 similarly did not make domicile the
key factor in obtaining jurisdiction, and held that vol,,"-ary sub-
mission to the court's jurisdiction was sufficient to rendci (he court
competent.
The Rosenstiel court also concerned itself with the potential vi-
olation of state public policy by recognizing a divorce obtained on
grounds outside the New York law. To this inquiry, it looked to
Matter of Rhinelander" which held that, "if the parties both ap-
peared before the foreign court, the New York court will recognize
the divorce even if it was based on grounds not recognized in New
York."'" This conclusion stems from state common law which
recognized a foreign decree even when the primary purpose of the
parties in leaving the state was to obtain the divorce.7 2
The court also noted that the bilateral foreign decree has been
63 Weil v. Weil, 26 N.Y.S.2d 467,470 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941).
64 Weibel v. Weibel, 37 Misc. 2d 162, 234 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Heine v.
Heine, 231 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1962), afl'd mem., 19 App. Div. 2d 695, 242
N.Y.S.2d 705 (1963).
65 Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296, 302, 12 N.E.2d 305, 307 (1938).
66Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 43 Misc. 2d 462, 251 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1964),
afi'd, 21 App. Div. 2d 635,253 N.Y.S.2d 206 (lst Dep't 1964).
67 123 F. Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
68 Id. at 247.
69 Wood v. Wood, 22 App. Div. 2d 660, 253 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1st Dep't 1964).
70 290 N.Y. 14, 47 N.E.2d 681 (1943).
71 Id. at 36,47 N.E.2d at 684.
72 Gould v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490 (1923).
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considered valid for nearly twenty-five years and could not be over-
turned on a policy basis without some identifiable change in public
policy.73 The application of the Haitian and Dominican divorce
codes under New York law would not seem to present any diffi-
culties that are unresolved by the Rosentiel case.
While the case law of New York seems willing to respect for-
eign decrees of divorce, public policy contained within the General
Obligation Laws7 4 may pose a statutory impediment in the process
of foreign divorce recognition. That law's prohibition of divorce
by prior agreement creates some conceptual difficulties with New
York's liberal view of foreign decrees. This is particularly true in
the Dominican Republic which considers mutual consent as the ex-
clusive ground for divorce. Use of the mutual consent basis could
conflict with the Obligation law either by (1) construing the mu-
tual consent vehicle as a contract to alter or dissolve marriage or (2)
viewing the use of mutual consent as an express provision requiring
the dissolution of the marriage. In either case, casting the mutual
consent ground in this light could fail to meet the tests of the Obli-
gation laws.
Another New York statutory provision which warrants consid-
eration is the Domestic Relations Law.75 It provides for much the
same prima facie presumption with respect to domicile as provided
in the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act. However, the one re-
ported decision dealing with the effect of this statute on a foreign
decree did not change the New York position.76 In that case the
court upheld the validity of a bilateral Mexican divorce and noted
that if the "legislature sought to nullify the effect of the Rosentiel
case on foreign divorces, then certainly more decisive language
could have been chosen."77  As a result, the Domestic Relations
Law does not appear to bar recognition of decrees obtained by non-
domiciliaries in either Haiti or the Dominican Republic.
CONCLUSION
The traditional domiciliary basis for in rem jurisdiction over mar-
73 21 App. Div. 2d at 639, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
74 N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 3-5 11 (McKinney Supp. 1972-73). The statute
points out that a "husband and wife cannot contract to alter or dissolve the marriage....
An agreement ... between husband and wife shall not be considered a contract to alter
or dissolve the marriage unless it contains an express provision r'equiring the dissolu-
tion of the marriage or provides for the procurement of grounds for divorce."
7 5 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 250 (McKinney Supp. 1972-73).
76 Kakarapis v. Kakarapis, 58 Misc. 2d 515, 296 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1968).
77 Id. at 517, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
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ital matters, which precludes the recognition of divorce decrees ob-
tained in Mexico, would also seem to preclude recognition of those
decrees obtained from Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This res
theory has been rejected in New York with the consequence that
such decrees will likely be respected in that jurisdiction.
While the case law within New York would not seem to be an
impediment to recognition of Haitian or Dominican divorces, cer-
tain statutes do question the validity of these decrees. The Gen-
eral Obligation Law, § 3-511, could be interpreted to find a divorce
obtained on the mutual consent ground as violative of the state's
public policy with respect to divorce. Also, the effect of the Domes-
tic Relations Laws, § 250, could result in the placing of more em-
phasis on domicile as a means of a court obtaining jurisdiction over
the parties. Under the possible interpretation of either of these
statutes, the validity of a Haitian or Dominican divorce is conceiv-
ably at issue.
ROBERT STEUK*
Mr. Steuk is now associated with the firm of Shute, Engel and Frazier in Exeter,
New Hampshire.
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